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WHITE LAWYERING: RETHINKING RACE,
LAWYER IDENTITY, AND RULE OF LAW
Russell G. Pearce*
The triumph of what might be termed the standard version of the
professional project would, I believe, be the creation, by virtue of
professional education, of almost purely fungible members of the
respective professional community. Such apparent aspects of the
self as one's race, gender, religion, or ethnic background would
become irrelevant to defining one's capacities as a lawyer.
- Sanford Levinson
1
I am one-of-a-kind as a person-as is everyone who reads this
chapter. I am also a member of the white racial group-as everyone
who reads this chapter is a member of a racial group. I am male -as
everyone who reads this chapter has a gender-group membership.
In these three psychological conditions, we all participate. Even if I
were to try to escape my racial-or gender-group memberships,
members of my own and other racial and gender groups would treat
me as if I were a member of my groups.
- Clayton P. Alderfer2
This Essay will explore what it means to be a white person in the
legal profession3 and how recognition of whiteness as racial identity
4
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Co-Director, Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics. I would like to thank Clay Alderfer, Regina Austin,
Noran Camp, Clark Cunningham, Sheila Foster, Brian Glick, Jennifer Gordon, Bruce
Green, Isabelle Gunning, Craig Gurian, Robin Lenhardt, Robert Smith, David
Thomas, Paul Tremblay, and Amy Uelmen for their comments. I would also like to
thank my research assistant Jadhira Rivera for her wise counsel and excellent work.
1. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
Construction of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577, 1578-79 (1993).
2. Clayton P. Alderfer, A White Man's Perspective on the Unconscious Processes
Within Black-White Relations in the United States, in Human Diversity: Perspectives
on People in Context 201, 202 (Edison J. Trickett et al. eds., 1994).
3. Although this Essay focuses on whiteness, it makes no claims-and indeed
rejects the notions-that race is the only significant identity in lawyering or that racial
identity does not intersect and interact with other identities. See infra Parts II, IV. A
number of scholars have discussed how nonracial identities influence lawyering. See,
e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculating on a Woman's
Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39, 45-58 (1985) (gender); Russell G.
Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A
Challenge and an Invitation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 127 (2004) (religion); William B.
Rubenstein, In Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar, 48
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requires a dramatic rethinking of professional norms. As white
people, we too often view racial issues as belonging to people of
color.5 We tend to do that in one of two ways. Some whites believe
that race generally does not matter except in the rare case of an
intentional racist. Other whites view whites generally as racists and
look to people of color to tell them how to understand issues of race.
This Essay rejects both of these approaches. The Essay argues that
for white lawyers, as well as lawyers of color, increased "'competence
[in] dealing with racial matters' and "'speak[ing] openly, frankly, and
professionally about relations"' is necessary both to competent client
representation and equal justice under law.
Hastings L.J. 1101 (1997) (sexual orientation). For a discussion of intersectionality,
see, for example, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139 (1989); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality," "Multidimensionality," and the
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 285
(2001); Mari Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1183 (1991); Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation
in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in
Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars As Cultural Warriors, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev.
1409 (1998). Many commentators have previously written on racial identity and
lawyering, either generally, see, e.g., Jean Koh Peters, Representing Children in Child
Protective Proceedings: Ethical and Practical Dimensions 241-327 (2001); Sue
Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 Clinical
L. Rev. 33 (2001); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering
Courses, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (1993); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling
Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 373 (2002), or from the
perspective of lawyers of color, see, e.g., Melissa Harrison & Margaret E. Montoya,
Voices!Voces in the Borderlands: A Colloquy on Re/Constructing Identities in
Re/Constructed Legal Spaces, 6 Colum. J. Gender & L. 387, 410 (1996); David B.
Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57
Md. L. Rev. 1502 (1998). Fewer commentators have examined the issue through the
lens of the white lawyer. See, e.g., Harrison & Montoya, supra, at 410; Marjorie A.
Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 Fla. Coastal L.J.
219, 232 (2002).
4. There is an extensive literature on whiteness. See, e.g., Critical White Studies:
Looking Behind the Mirror (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Critical White Studies]; Ian F. Haney L6pez, White by Law: The Legal
Construction of Race (1996); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege Revealed: How
Invisible Preference Undermines America (1996); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title
VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 Yale L.J. 2009
(1995); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); Peggy
McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, Creation Spirituality,
Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 33.
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. Alderfer, supra note 2, at 218. Organizational theorist Clayton Alderfer finds
this framing more useful than liberal use of the term "racist." He argues that
[t]he number of individuals who are deeply and profoundly racist
characterologically is small in comparison to the amount of collective racism
most of us participate in a good deal of the time. Moreover, labeling an
individual serves mainly as a defensive function for the labeler and, if the
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Applying the insights of intergroup theory, the Essay suggests that
whether they view themselves as color-blind or racist, white lawyers
understandably have a tendency to treat whiteness as a neutral norm
or baseline, and not a racial identity, and tend to view racial issues as
belonging primarily to people of color, whether lawyers or clients.7
This approach is consistent with, and reinforces, the prevailing
professional norm that lawyers should "bleach out" their racial, as
well as their other personal, identities.'
As this Essay explains, this unfortunate symbiosis of whiteness and
professionalism undermines the work of lawyers both in their
representation of clients and in their systemic efforts to promote the
rule of law.9 The latest research in the field of organizational behavior
suggests that the assumption of lawyer neutrality so central to lawyer
professionalism is not only wrong descriptively, but that it also
undermines the very goals it seeks to promote. In particular the
pathbreaking research of Robin Ely and David Thomas demonstrates
that in a diverse society and legal profession an integration-and-
learning perspective that openly acknowledges and manages racial
identity would far better promote excellent client representation and
equal justice under law than the currently dominant commitment to
color blindness.10
I. INTERGROUP THEORY
Intergroup theory offers a way to "understand, explain, and predict
relations between groups... in organizations."'" It suggests that
group identities, such as racial identity, influence conduct in
organizations.12  The organizations comprising the legal system
expression is made directly to the individual, heightens resistance to learning
by that person and by anyone who may observe the event.
Id. Alderfer instead advocates a "formulation emphasiz[ing] greater understanding
and improved skill rather than blame." Id.
7. See infra Parts II, III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Parts III, IV.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Clayton P. Alderfer, Problems of Changing White Males' Behavior and Beliefs
Concerning Race Relations, in Change in Organizations 122, 137 (Paul Goodman &
Assocs. eds., 1982). Intergroup theory defines a group as
a collection of individuals (1) who have significantly interdependent
relations with each other, (2) who perceive themselves to be a group by
reliably distinguishing members from nonmembers, (3) whose group identity
is recognized by nonmembers, (4) who, as group members acting alone or in
concert, have significantly interdependent relations with other groups, and
(5) whose roles in groups are therefore a function of expectations from
themselves, from other group members, and from nongroup members.
Alderfer, supra note 2, at 222.
12. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on
Levinson, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1632 (1993); see Clayton P. Alderfer & David A.
Thomas, The Significance of Race and Ethnicity for Understanding Organizational
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include the system itself, as well as constituent organizations such as
law schools, law firms, courts, bar groups, and the profession as a
whole. 13 Within these organizations, individuals "are shaped by at
least three sets of forces: their own unique personalities, the groups
with whom they personally identify to a significant degree, and the
groups with whom others associate them-whether or not they wish
such an association." 4  The two major groups in organizations are
"identity groups and organization groups." 15
As I noted in an earlier article, "[p]rofessional socialization as a
lawyer is an organizational group identification." 6 Membership in
organizational groups is "based on task, function and hierarchy."' 7
Persons in organizational groups share "similar primary tasks,
participate in comparable work experiences and, as a result, tend to
develop common organizational views."' 8  Being a member of the
lawyer organizational group "involves similar tasks, comparable
experiences, and comparable organizational views. Among the
factors that make law a particularly powerful group experience is the
shared three years of law school, often at a young age, combined with
a long and often continuous membership in the profession."' 9
While all lawyers are members of the lawyer organizational group,
that group further divides into other organizational groups, such as
partners and associates, or litigators and judges.
Identity group membership, such as race, derives from identities
external to the organization. As a general matter, "[m]embers of
identity groups share common biological characteristics, participate in
equivalent historical experiences and, as a result, tend to develop
similar world views."2  Identity group membership is sufficiently
powerful that it influences conduct within organizations.2' Its power
Behavior, in International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 1, 6-7
(Cary L. Cooper & Ivan T. Robertson eds., 1988).
13. I have previously applied intergroup theory to the role of religious identity in
the legal system. See Pearce, supra note 12, at 1631-34.
14. Alderfer & Thomas, supra note 12, at 7.
15. David A. Thomas & Clayton P. Alderfer, The Influence of Race on Career
Dynamics: Theory and Research on Minority Career Experiences, in Handbook of
Career Theory 133, 145 (Michael B. Arthur et al. eds., 1989). The original source for
this theory is Clayton P. Alderfer & Ken K. Smith, Studying Intergroup Relations
Embedded in Organizations, 27 Admin. Sci. Q. 35, 38 (1982).
16. Pearce, supra note 12, at 1633.
17. Id. at 1632.
18. Thomas & Alderfer, supra note 15, at 145.
19. Pearce, supra note 12, at 1633.
20. Thomas & Alderfer, supra note 15, at 145. Although not directly relevant to
this Essay's analysis of racial identity, I have previously argued that biological
characteristics are not necessary to the creation of an identity group. For example, "a
religious identity group, such as Jews," can share "'equivalent historical experiences'
leading to 'similar world views' without sharing biological characteristics. Pearce,
supra note 12, at 1632 n.122.
21. Pearce, supra note 12, at 1632.
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derives from its pervasive role in an individual's life. Identity group
membership often begins at birth and continues throughout an
individual's life "or, as in the case of age, changes as the result of
natural development. '22  While powerful, organizational group
memberships generally develop later than identity groups and "can
change as people enter and leave organizations" or shift their role
within organizations.23
According to intergroup theory, "individuals and organizations are
constantly attempting, consciously and unconsciously, to manage
potential conflicts arising from the interface between identity and
organization group memberships. '24  As Clayton P. Alderfer has
noted, "[r]elations among identity groups and among organizational
groups are shaped by how these groups and their representatives are
embedded in the organization and also by how the organization is
embedded in its environment., 25 Embeddedness is congruent "where
power relations at a particular level within an organization are similar
to those at other levels of the organization, or in society as a whole,"
and incongruent where they are not.26 Incongruent embeddedness
causes increased strain for the individual and the organization.27
II. DRAWING A PICTURE OF THE WHITE LAWYER
In 1991, I was part of a team that created an intergroup theory
exercise for the first-year class at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.28 I use a version of this exercise in my ethics seminar as a way
to begin a unit on lawyer identity and justice. The students' task is to
work in identity groups to create a picture29 describing their identity
group's experience as law students.3 °
To facilitate the formation of identity groups, the exercise starts by
dividing the students into four race- and gender-based groups: women
22. Thomas & Alderfer, supra note 15, at 145.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Alderfer, supra note 11, at 142.
26. Pearce, supra note 12, at 1633 (citing Alderfer & Thomas, supra note 12, at 15-
16).
27. Alderfer & Thomas, supra note 12, at 15-16.
28. The authors of the group were a four-person mixed-race and -gender team led
by Professor David Thomas of Harvard Business School. The other members of the
team were Professor Robin J. Ely of Harvard Business School, Professor Elaine
Yakura of Michigan State University School of Labor and Industrial Relations, and
me. The original exercise was a four-hour unit on diversity in the legal profession.
29. Students often object to drawing a picture, as did I originally as the only legal
academic among the authors of the exercise. The rationale for drawing a picture, as
well as for focusing on the student's personal experiences, is that law students are
verbally talented people who are adept at using verbal strategies to avoid connecting
their personal feelings to their intellectual inquiries. My experience has been that my
first reaction was wrong and that the exercise of drawing a picture leads to
extraordinarily valuable results.
30. This should include work experiences during law school.
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of color, men of color, white women, and white men.31 The basis for
this division is the hypothesis that for.most students, their race and
gender are the most salient identities. I then suggest that the students
consider dividing their groups further according to other identities
that result in significantly different experiences. These identities
could include the various subgroups within the people of color group,
including Asian, Black, or Latino; as well as identities found in all
groups, such as sexual orientation, class, disability, and whether the
student went directly from college to law school.32 When the identity
groups complete their pictures, they post them on the wall and
describe them. The class discussion begins with the role of identity
group differences in the law school experience and moves to the role
of these differences in the legal system and their implications for the
rule of law.33
For this Essay, I have essentially done what I have often asked my
students to do. My picture of the law school offers a collage of views.
To illustrate the ease I feel as a white person in a position of authority
in a predominantly white institution, I would draw a picture of myself
discussing the question of whether to invite students to call them by
their first name in class with colleagues who are white women and
people of color-I do and they do not. This ease sometimes makes
me miss ways in which issues of race and gender influence my work.
As I draw this picture, I realize that in recent years, I have become so
complacent that I have not spent time thinking about how having a
white man as the facilitator influences the students and me, and I am
considering returning to a past practice of inviting faculty of color into
the conversation with the students.
My picture will also identify how some students- usually but not
always white-will reject identifying themselves on the basis of race
and how some students- usually but not always students of color-
will indicate that race is a significant part of their experience as law
students. Students of color, but never yet a white student, will
describe the experience, while working during the summer, of having
lawyers mistake them for secretaries or messengers.
I would draw a similar picture of my Housing Rights Clinic. When
the white students-or I-wear a suit and go to court to teach the
Housing Rights Clinic, the first assumption of court personnel is that
we are lawyers. Almost every year, we will have an incident where
31. Not all students readily fit themselves into one of these four groups. Mixed-
race students have asked to create their own group and Arab-American students have
struggled with their identity.
32. While the students in the first-year class at Penn readily divided themselves
into subgroups, most students in my seminar decide to stay together and reflect their
diversity in their picture. I believe this occurs because the smaller number of students
in the seminar makes it difficult for students both to separate into subgroups and to
find colleagues with whom to share the exercise.
33. These classes are both pedagogically valuable and emotionally difficult.
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court personnel or opposing lawyers assume that a student of color is
a party and not a legal representative.
These relations in the legal system mirror, in turn, relations in
society as a whole. I would depict what I think of as well-dressed
white man's privilege-the ability often (though less often since 9/11)
to walk confidently past a security guard without being questioned, in
contrast to friends of color who have had the opposite experience of
more intense scrutiny. I would add to the societal section a picture of
the judge of color who tells how white people assume he is a doorman
when he holds a door for them as a courtesy.
My picture is informed both by my personal experience and by the
literature on race relations. As a general descriptive matter, white
people are the dominant racial group in legal organizations. They
represent 83.2% of judges, 34 89.2% of lawyers, 35 and 79.5% of law
students,36 percentages which exceed the 75.1% of the American
population that is white.37 In elite legal jobs, the white domination is
even greater. Whites represent almost 98% of partners in the 100 top
law firms.38
As the dominant racial group, whites can view ourselves as having
no particular racial identity. An African-American friend recently
described his impression that newspaper stories describing lawyers
usually identified the race of lawyers of color but mentioned no race
for white lawyers. As a member of the dominant group in the legal
profession, the white lawyer is the norm.39 With regard at least to our
race, we start by looking around the room and feeling like we belong,
as is so often the experience of white students, particularly the men, in
my seminar who do not see race as a useful way to discuss their
experience. We feel comfortable with authority. Accordingly, I do
34. Am. Bar Ass'n, Statistics about Minorities in the Profession from the 2000
Census, at http://www.abanet.org/minorities/links/2000census.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2005).
35. Id.
36. Am. Bar Ass'n, Statistics of J.D. Degrees Awarded from 1984-2002, at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/jd.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
37. U.S. Census Bureau, USA: People Quickfacts, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
38. Harvey Berkman, Past Struggles Echo as Clinton Makes a Pitch for Pro Bono
Work, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1999, at A8. David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati have
provided a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon with regard to black lawyers.
See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 493, 496 (1996)
(noting that "[a]lthough the number of black students graduating from law schools
has increased significantly in recent decades, blacks still make up a very small
minority of the lawyers working in large corporate firms (emphasis omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Wildman, supra note 4, at 14-20; Flagg, supra note 4, at 2013;
McIntosh, supra note 4, at 33-34.
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not worry that my students will challenge my authority when I invite
them to call me by my first name. °
Another aspect of viewing ourselves as having no particular racial
identity is seeing issues of race as that of people of color and not of
white people."' I represent this phenomenon in my picture through
my white students who do not see themselves as having a white
identity and who object to exploring issues of race. Clayton P.
Alderfer has observed that "[w]hite people do not easily discuss race
relations. For most whites, the range of feelings goes from
uncomfortable to severely uncomfortable."42 He finds that whites'
"most common behavioral pattern is avoiding the issue, if at all
possible. When that response is not feasible, the next line of defense
is to deny the presence of racial dynamics."43
The experience of law students and lawyers of color is quite
different. As a minority group in the legal profession, they have "no
choice except to learn about white culture if they are to survive."'
When people of color look around the room, they know they are not
the dominant culture and do not necessarily assume the same fit and
the same authority. Enhancing this effect is the congruence of white
dominance in the legal profession with white dominance in a society
where whites have a greater share of wealth and power. When white
lawyers, judges, and court personnel assume my students of color are
tenants and not legal representatives, or assume a summer associate of
color is a member of the support staff, they are applying
generalizations about race relations congruent with the relative
distribution of racial power found in society in general.46 The
incongruence of the authority position of being a lawyer, or of having
a position of authority within the legal profession, complicates the
organizational tasks of lawyers of color.
While race makes a significant difference in our experiences as
lawyers, intergroup theory reminds us that it is not determinative.47
40. I have to admit, though, that I believe I am alone even among my white male
colleagues in inviting students to call me by my first name although a number of
faculty call students by their first name.
41. See, e.g., Harrison & Montoya, supra note 3, at 410; see also infra Part III.A.
42. Alderfer, supra note 2, at 217.
43. Id.
44. Alderfer, supra note 11, at 144.
45. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile,
and Unequal (1995); CNN.com, Wealth Gap Seen As Top Civil Rights Issue: Blacks
Lag in Stock Market Investments, Home Ownership, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/01/17/wealth.gap.ap/index.html (Jan. 17, 2005) (noting
that "black families as a whole had only 10 cents in wealth for every dollar white
families had").
46. For a more detailed description of experiences of lawyers of color, see Peggy
C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559 (1989), and for academics of
color, see Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the Academy: Of Poets and
Kings, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 331 (1992).
47. See Alderfer, supra note 2, at 202-03.
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These experiences, like those relevant to organizational groups and
other identity groups to which we belong, provide us with data. How
we manage that data-whether we acknowledge it consciously and
how we respond to it-is a matter of choice on both an individual and
group level.4 8 One way I choose to manage my white identity is to
acknowledge and discuss issues of race with my students and
colleagues and, indeed, to write this Essay as a way of communicating
with a broader group of legal academics, lawyers, and law students.
Although this Essay represents a preliminary account of the white
experience in the legal profession, this part offers at least two
conclusions: White racial identity exists and whites tend to avoid
acknowledging their identity.
III. THE SYMBIOSIS OF WHITENESS AND PROFESSIONALISM
UNDERMINES WHITE LAWYERS' WORK
Despite the persistence of racial identity group influences, white
lawyers tend to deny the influence of their racial identity group on
their work as lawyers. When professionalism's ideological
commitment to color blindness reinforces this tendency, the resulting
symbiosis undermines the capacity of white lawyers to represent
clients to the best of their ability.
A. The Symbiosis of Whiteness and Professionalism
A dominant value common to the organizational identity of lawyers
is professionalism's commitment to the color blindness of lawyers'
conduct.49 In Sandy Levinson's famous formulation, professional
socialization "bleaches out" racial differences among lawyers, as well
as other individual characteristics. 0 Under this view, all lawyers
should be-and in most instances are- fungible. Not only should race
play no role in how a lawyer approaches her work, but with few
exceptions it will play no role. White lawyers who follow the
48. See id.
49. An interesting illustration of this phenomenon is found in a study of the
lawyers in the Civil Division of the Legal Aid Society. Roland Acevedo et al., Race
and Representation: A Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perceptions of the
Significance of Race, 18 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 1 (2000). Although white lawyers and
lawyers of color differed markedly as to whether race was a factor in representation
and whether "clients take the race of their attorney into account," a majority of
lawyers of all races agreed that they personally did not "take the race of their client
into consideration." Id. at 33-45, 53. Accordingly, with regard to how they
understood their own thought processes, lawyers of all races shared a commitment to
color blindness derived from membership in the lawyer organizational group that
apparently trumped differences based on membership in different racial identity
groups.
50. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1578-79; see Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 11 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 613,616-18 (1986); Wilkins, supra note 3, 1503-06, 1514-50.
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dominant approach will actually believe that this is an accurate
account and that they themselves are neutral as to race. Accordingly,
they will reject the notion that they should examine the influence of
their white identity on their lawyering.
Of course, in doing so, they are reinforcing their general tendency
as white people to avoid issues of race. While a small minority of
whites embrace their white racial identity, with both its positive and
negative aspects,5 most whites tend to see themselves as the neutral
norm, rather than as a particular racial identity.52 Race is for people
of color.
Some whites with this perspective will view law practice, like
society, as essentially color-blind.53 In this world, racial influence is
rare, generally extending only to those few whites who are openly
racist. Accordingly, when people of color raise issues of race, they
"play the race card"54 and create phony issues to promote their own
interests.
Other whites with a similar understanding of racial dynamics may
reach an opposite conclusion. They believe that white racism is a
significant societal problem. White people, lacking a proper claim to
racial identity and colluding in white racial dominance, have little to
offer on racial issues. Under this view, people of color have-and
whites lack-the ability to understand, or to engage in productive
discussions regarding, race. White people should defer to people of
color who are experts on race.5
51. Alderfer, supra note 2, at 220-21.
52. Id. at 217-21; see supra note 39.
53. See Alderfer, supra note 2, at 217.
54. A famous example of this approach is found in the critique of Johnnie
Cochran "playing the race card" in the O.J. Simpson trial. See Jeffrey Rosen, The
Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory, the Law, and the Triumph
of Color in America, New Republic, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27, 41-42. For responses to this
critique, see Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: "Racialism" and Reason, 95 Mich. L.
Rev. 723, 735 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Representing Race: Beyond "Sellouts" and
"Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 Mich. L.
Rev. 766, 788-94 (1997); Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1514-50; David B. Wilkins,
Straightjacketing Professionalism: A Comment on Russell, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 795
(1997).
55. See, e.g., Alderfer, supra note 2, at 219-20 (describing white "true-believer
antiracism"); Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity: An Interview with Noel
Ignatiev of Race Traitor Magazine, in Critical White Studies, supra note 4, at 607, 609
(asserting that "[b]lackness means total, implacable, and relentless opposition to that
system. To the extent so-called whites oppose the race line, repudiate their own race
privileges, and jeopardize their own standing in the white race, they can be said to
have washed away their whiteness and taken in some blackness"); Peter Halewood,
White Men Can Jump: But Must Try a Little Harder, in Critical White Studies, supra
note 4, at 627, 628 (asserting that the notion that white scholars can proceed with "a
feminist or anti-racist" analysis is "fundamentally flawed" and that white scholars
should instead study "[a] particular form of subordination.., from those who actually
live that perspective rather than attempting to master it in the abstract"): Harrison &
Montoya, supra note 3, at 410 (observing that "[a]t first,... I thought no one was
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Professionalism's "bleaching out" approach and these tendencies of
white people mutually reinforce certain conduct. They discourage
white lawyers from acknowledging that their race is an influence and
from exploring the extent to which their white identity plays a role in
their work settings. They further discourage white lawyers from
engaging in dialogue regarding issues of race with each other, as well
as with people of color. In a diverse legal system, where white lawyers
work with colleagues, adversaries, judges, clients, and witnesses of
color, the potential negative impact of these practices on a lawyer's
work is quite significant.
B. How the Symbiosis Undermines Lawyer's Work: An Illustration
White law professor Clark Cunningham has provided an
extraordinarily thoughtful and nuanced analysis of the representation
he and two white students provided an African-American man facing
a misdemeanor charge of disturbing the peace arising from a traffic
stop.56 The police officer had described the African-American client
as having told the police he had been stopped "'because he was
black'" and the Judge "described [the] client as 'hollering racism. '
Nonetheless, even though Cunningham suspected that "what
happened... was a 'racial incident,'.., as a lawyer [he] did not talk
about 'the case' that way, and therefore [he] ceased to think in terms
of racial issues .... "58 Accordingly, Cunningham and the students did
not discuss with their client, or argue to the court, that the treatment
of their client had a racial dimension." After the prosecution
dismissed the case, the client angrily assailed Cunningham and the
students for patronizing him and treating him the same way that other
white authority figures did.6"
Cunningham attributes the failure to address the racial aspects of
the case to two factors. First, the client never raised the claim with his
white lawyers. Cunningham suggests that his African-American client
interested in hearing what I termed mv 'white or Anglo angst,' but. among other
thin~s.]... bv only seeing myself as white and orivileged and Margaret as an
ovoressed person of color, I essentialized her and forced her to do most of the
work"). Whites are not alone in taking this position. See, e.g., Paul E. Lee & Mary M.
Lee, Reflections from the Bottom of the Well: Racial Bias in the Provision of Legal
Services to the Poor, Clearinghouse Rev., Special Issue 1993, at 311,312-14.
56. Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1298 (1992). This
article has been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri,
Stances, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1233 (1992); Harrison & Montoya, supra note 3, at 420-21;
Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 345 (1997); Silver, supra note 3.
57. Cunningham, supra note 56, at 1370.
58. Id. at 1370-71; see also id. at 1325-26, 1368.
59. Interestingly, even though they did not discuss with their clients whether the
incident was a racial one, they did ask whether the officers were white. Id. at 1323.
60. Id. at 1329-30.
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might not have believed he could share with his white lawyers the
view he expressed after the completion of the case-that the white
lawyers would have been just as skeptical as other white authority
figures were.6' Second, Cunningham and his students did not reach
the racial issue because as lawyers they turned first to readily available
"race neutral" defenses.62
What Cunningham does not explore is the possibility that race
influenced his own conduct and that of his students. Perhaps as whites
and lawyers, they began assuming the norm that race is not a factor.
Therefore, they would not on their own initiative raise the possibility
that race played a role either in the matter or in their relationship with
their client. Indeed, their expectation that the African-American
client would raise issues of race if they existed suggests that the white
lawyers might have applied the assumption that race is an issue for
people of color and not for whites.
The lawyers' white identity could also have attributed to their
failure to follow up on specific evidence indicating that they should
explore how racial identities influenced the case. Here, the police
report revealed that the African-American client had suggested that
his race was a factor in his stop. When the white judge described the
charge against the African-American defendant as an "attitude"63
charge, he may very well have been signaling that the charge resulted
from the defendant's inappropriate and racially based response to the
police officers. Even though Cunningham as a progressive white
person had an "impression" that the incident was racial, he may not
have pursued this intuition 64 because the embeddedness of the
authority relationship with his client was consistent with that of the
white police officer and judge. After the case ended, the African-
American client certainly noted that this was his perception-that the
white lawyers had treated him in the same paternalistic way as the
other white authority figures.
Last, Cunningham's explanation that the white lawyers naturally
turned to a race-neutral strategy represents a symbiosis of whiteness
and of professional values. The professional ideal that lawyers and
law should be neutral provides support for preferring a race-neutral
strategy if readily available, as in this case. It also supports the
tendency of whites to avoid confronting racial issues. In this way,
whiteness and professional values are mutually reinforcing.
This example is but one illustration of how the symbiosis of
whiteness and professionalism undermines white lawyers' ability to
provide their clients with optimal representation. Of course, as
intergroup theory suggests, quality lawyering requires attention to
61. Id. at 1378.
62. Id. at 1371, 1377.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
2092 [Vol. 73
WHITE LAWYERING
race on the part of all lawyers, not just white lawyers, and in all
situations, not just cross-racial ones. The dominant professional
paradigm of "bleaching out" race (and other differences) is wrong
both as a matter of description and as a matter of maximizing the
effectiveness of a lawyer's work.
IV. RETHINKING THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
AND RULE OF LAW
Two central goals lawyers share through their organizational group
identity as members of the legal profession are commitment as an
individual or firm to excellence in representing clients, and
commitment as a community to maintaining a legal system that
adheres to the rule of law. In order for lawyers to improve their ability
individually and communally to attain these goals, the legal profession
should discard the bleaching out assumption in favor of an
integration-and-learning perspective that acknowledges the influence
of identity group affiliations on lawyers' work.65
A. The Integration-and-Learning Approach Works Better Than a
Color-Blind Model
In two recent studies, leading organizational scholars Robin Ely and
David Thomas have demonstrated that the "integration-and-learning"
paradigm is more effective in achieving organizational goals than the
"discrimination-and-fairness" model currently dominant in the legal
profession. 66 In the integration-and-learning approach, members of a
work force "are receptive to the notion that racial differences may
underlie team members' expectations, norms, and assumptions about
65. David Wilkins has eloquently argued that a lawyer can possibly reconcile race
consciousness with prevailing professional norms. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1567-94.
Even if it were possible for most lawyers to "[l]earn[] to [Iive in the [c]ontradictions,"
id. at 1569, as Wilkins urges, (and I am skeptical that it is), this Essay deals with a
slightly different question- not whether consciousness of racial identity is permissible
under professional norms but whether it is preferable in order to achieve professional
goals. Wilkins seeks to delineate the moral obligations of black lawyers and to
preserve a commitment to social justice amidst "market-based diversity arguments."
David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1548 (2004); see also David B. Wilkins, Do Clients
Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 855 (1998) [hereinafter David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical
Obligations?]; Wilkins, supra note 3.
66. Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of
Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 Admin. Sci. Q.
229, 260-65 (2001) [hereinafter, Ely & Thomas, Cultural Diversity]; Robin J. Ely &
David A. Thomas, Team Learning and the Racial Diversity-Performance Link 23-35
(2004) [hereinafter Ely & Thomas, Team Learning] (Harvard Business School
Working Paper No. 05-026) (on file with author). David Wilkins has noted the
importance of their work to lawyering. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have
Ethical Obligations?, supra note 65, at 861-67; Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1592.
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work and that these differences are worth exploring as a source of
insights into how the group might improve its effectiveness."67 Co-
workers "openly acknowledge and negotiate their differences in
service of their goals.
68
In contrast, in the discrimination-and-fairness approach, such as the
"bleaching out" paradigm dominant in the legal profession, 69 "cultural
diversity is a mechanism for eliminating racial injustice, and.., is of
no use in furthering the group's work. '7 Under this paradigm, "group
members aspire to be color blind" and confine "discourse about
race .. to the possibility of racial biases in the group.
71
Ely and Thomas found significant advantages for the integration-
and-learning approach.72 In one study, they examined organizations
employing competing models. The integration-and-learning
workplace benefited from "cross-cultural exposure and learning
and... work processes designed to facilitate constructive intergroup
conflict and exploration of diverse views"; while the discrimination-
and-fairness workplace displayed "low morale of employees, lack of
cross-cultural learning, and the inability of employees of color to bring
all relevant skills and insights to bear on work. '73 In the integration-
and-learning model, "all employees fe[lt] fully respected and valued
for their competence and contributions"; this is in contrast to the
discrimination-and-fairness workplace, where "[e]mployees of color
67. Ely & Thomas, Team Learning, supra note 66, at 9. Applying intergroup
theory, the integration-and-learning perspective recognizes the continuing influence
of identity group membership and "assume[es] that cultural differences, such as those
stemming from race, are useful to the group because they give rise to different life
experiences, knowledge, and insights." Id.
68. Id.
69. See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 584 (1999)
(observing that "bleaching out" is the Ely and Thomas "discrimination-and-fairness"
paradigm).
70. Ely & Thomas, Team Learning, supra note 66, at 11.
71. Id. at 12. Ely and Thomas also explore a third perspective- "access-and-
legitimacy." Id. at 11. Like the discrimination-and-fairness approach, the access-and-
legitimacy model "assum[es] that cultural differences have limited value or are
irrelevant to the group's work." Id. This model promotes "cultural diversity...
insofar as it enables the organization to match market segments to parts of its
workforce as a way to gain access and appear legitimate to those market segments."
Id. Organizations following this model "do not incorporate the cultural competencies
of their members into their core functions but, instead, define circumscribed roles for
racial minorities that limit their contributions to market-interfacing functions." Id.
This Essay will not examine this model in detail because it does not reflect the
dominant approach of legal professionalism and because Ely and Thomas found it
less effective than the integration-and-learning model. See Ely & Thomas, Cultural
Diversity, supra note 66, at 261 tbl.3; Ely & Thomas, Team Learning, supra note 66, at
8-9. Nonetheless, it may very well be that some law firms apply this model in
selecting lawyers of color to appeal to clients, adversaries, or juries of color, or that
the selection procedures for judges might apply the model to selecting judges for
communities of color.
72. See Ely & Thomas, Cultural Diversity, supra note 66, at 261.
73. Id. at 261 tbl.3.
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fe[lt] disrespected and devalued."74  Similarly, "racial identity at
work" in the integration-and-learning model was "a source of value
for people of color, a resource for learning and teaching, [and] a
source of privilege for whites to acknowledge," while in the
discrimination-and-fairness model, racial identity was a "[s]ource of
powerlessness for people of color [and a] source of apprehension for
whites. '5
Although race-related conflicts occurred in both organizations,
under the integration-and-learning model, members of different
identity groups perceived themselves as having "equal power and
status" and "open[ly] discuss[ed] differences and conflict."76  In
contrast, under the discrimination-and-fairness model, Ely and
Thomas found "[i]ntractable race-related conflict stemming from
entrenched ... status and power imbalances; [with] no open
discussion of conflict or differences." 7
7
In another landmark study, Ely and Thomas compared the
performance of more than "275 retail branches of a bank."7 8 They
found that the integration-and-learning branches "significantly
outperformed" the discrimination-and-fairness branches in key work
performance criteria-"in new sales revenue and in total
performance. 79 Moreover, "racial diversity was negatively associated
with all three performance measures in branches" with a color-blind
approach, and "positively associated with them in branches with a
positive racial learning environment."8
B. Applying the Integration-and-Learning Model to Legal Practice
The answer for the legal profession is to replace the "bleaching out"
model, a discrimination-and-fairness approach, with an integration-
and-learning strategy. As a preliminary step in this direction, this
Essay will offer a framework for applying the teaching of Ely and
Thomas to client representation and rule of law.
1. Integration-and-Learning in Client Representation
The integration-and-learning approach requires reflection and
discussion in all aspects of client representation. As lawyers increase
their "'competence [in] dealing with racial matters,"'81 they should





78. Ely & Thomas, Team Learning, supra note 66, at 25.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id. at 25.
81. Alderfer, supra note 2, at 218.
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others with whom they are working, influences their relationships with
colleagues, clients, adversaries, and court personnel. Lawyers should
then, with their colleagues and clients, make explicit that issues of race
are open for discussion and "'speak openly, frankly, and
professionally about relations."'82 With this framework, lawyers will
learn much more from their colleagues and clients, who in turn will
learn much more from them. 3 As Ely and Thomas demonstrate, this
framework will result in lawyers treating-and being perceived as
treating-each other and their clients with more respect, moving
beyond erroneous assumptions to more accurate analysis and more
effective strategies, and working more successfully as a team with
colleagues.'
Ely and Thomas remind us that these strategies do not avoid
conflict. Rather, they offer a more effective way to manage conflicts
that are likely to occur or to exist even without open
acknowledgement. As Ely and Thomas advise managers, lawyers
should seek to maintain the trust necessary to implementing the
integration-and-learning approach "by demonstrat[ing] commitment
to the process and... by setting a tone of honest discourse, by
acknowledging tensions, and by resolving them sensitively and
swiftly." 85
If the white lawyers had applied this approach in the case study
described above, they would have acted quite differently. First, they
would have asked themselves whether their white identity influenced
how they perceived and were perceived by their African-American
client, the white police officer, and the white judge. Second, from the
beginning of the relationship and continuing throughout, they would
have invited their client to engage with them openly on issues of race.
Had they done so, they might have recognized the racial issues in the
case themselves, have learned of those implications from their client,
and have examined those issues in cooperation with their client. They
most likely would not have missed the racial tension with their client,
which existed throughout the representation but was only revealed by
the client after the case was over.
While resembling some of the approaches in the literature on
"cross-cultural lawyering,"86 this approach has a different emphasis.
82. Id.
83. For an example of such learning, see Harrison & Montoya, supra note 3, at
410. See also Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1592 (asserting that "[t]o the extent that black
lawyers help to open up a dialogue about the role of race and other forms of
contingent identity on professional practice, they will have performed an important
service for their own workplaces and for the profession as a whole").
84. Cf. David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New
Paradigm for Managing Diversity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79, 89.
85. Id. at 90.
86. See, e.g., Koh Peters, supra note 3; Bryant, supra note 3; Silver, supra note 3;
Tremblay, supra note 3.
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Like cross-cultural lawyering, it rejects color-blindness and
encourages self-reflection.8 7 Like the better work on cross-cultural
lawyering, it rejects the notions that cross-cultural lawyering is
exclusively an issue for white lawyers or in cross-cultural situations.88
Nonetheless, as a matter of emphasis, this rejection is much clearer
under an integration-and-learning approach that views all lawyers and
all clients as members of both organizational and identity groups at all
times.89
In one respect, though, the integration-and-learning approach is
irreconcilable with cross-cultural lawyering. Where cross-cultural
lawyering seeks a "non-judgmental approach towards yourself and
client,"90 the integration-and-learning approach rejects this goal as a
form of unrealistic and counterproductive color blindness or culture-
blindness. It instead requires informed judgments, together with
"open[],frank[], and professional[]" exchanges regarding those
judgments. 91 These very different goals also result in a different
emphasis with regard to learning. While both approaches value
learning of all types, cross-cultural strategies place a greater relative
emphasis on learning about different cultural styles, while the
integration-and-learning model places a greater relative emphasis on
learning between and among lawyers and clients themselves during
their relationships.
92
2. Rethinking Rule of Law
Intergroup theory also requires rethinking the connection between
"bleaching out" and rule of law. As discussed above, the term
"bleaching out," a term with obvious racial resonance, 93 describes
professionalism's commitment that all lawyers are fungible94 and
therefore free of influence from aspects of the self external to
organizational group identity, including race as well as gender,
religion, and other identity group characteristics. 95 The organizational
87. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 3, at 37, 56; Tremblay, supra note 3, at 383.
88. See, e.g., Koh Peters, supra note 3, at 251; Bryant, supra note 3, at 52-53, 57.
89. See supra Part I.
90. Bryant, supra note 3, at 49. To be fair, Koh Peters and Bryant argue for
"nonjudgmentalism" as a way to reduce defensiveness as a lawyer becomes aware of
her own biases and not as grounds for ignoring bias altogether. Koh Peters, supra
note 3, at 251-53; Bryant, supra note 3, at 59. Nonetheless, as a strategy, it does
counsel an "accepting" approach to recognizing biases and does not clearly demand
judgments regarding those biases once they are acknowledged. Koh Peters, supra
note 3, at 251-53; Bryant, supra note 3, at 59.
91. Koh Peters, supra note 3, at 251; Alderfer, supra note 2, at 218.
92. Compare Bryant, supra note 3, at 40-48, and Tremblay, supra note 3, at 380-81,
with supra text accompanying notes 69-85.
93. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1578-79; Pearce, supra note 12, at 1628-29; Wilkins,
supra note 3, at 1506-07.




group value of professionalism requires that race and other aspects of
the self "become irrelevant to defining one's capacities as a lawyer."96
This conception, in turn, derives from the mutually reinforcing
perspectives of role morality and rule of law. Professional role
morality presumes that "the professional's conduct is governed by the
morality dictated by the profession and not from outside the
profession." 9
7
The dominant conception of rule of law makes the command of role
morality even stronger for lawyers than for other professionals.
Under this view, "[r]ule of law implies that the quality of lawyering
and of justice an individual receives does not depend on the group
identity of the lawyer or judge." 98 This conception "posits that the
clash of opposing views before a neutral fact finder is the best way to
ascertain truth and justice." 99 For the system to work properly, "all
parties [must] receive equal representation" and for that to happen,
lawyers must "function as extreme partisans who should not bring
their own [identity] to bear on their representation.' ' 100
The theory of organizational behavior implicit in the "bleaching
out" paradigm runs directly counter to intergroup theory. The
professional socialization of organizational group affiliation within the
legal profession denies the very existence of identity groups. But, as
intergroup theory reminds us, demanding the exclusion of identity
group influence from the classroom, courtroom, and law firm will not
make it so.' Individuals within organizations have both
organizational group and identity group affiliations. No matter the
organizational values, identity group influences persist.
Moreover, as an empirical matter, Ely and Thomas's findings
demonstrate that "bleaching out" paradigms are less effective in
promoting organizational goals than a perspective that acknowledges
the persistence of identity group influences. They found, for example,
that a color-blind approach tends to perpetuate imbalances and
injustices between identity groups that exist within society as a whole
and fails to encourage people to achieve the highest functioning in
pursuing common goals. 02 In contrast, the integration-and-learning
96. Id. at 1579.
97. Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 3, at 143; see also Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1503.
This is true not only of lawyers but also of professionals generally. See, e.g., Alderfer,
supra note 2, at 210-13.
98. Pearce, supra note 12, at 1629.
99. Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 3, at 143.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Robert T. Carter & Ellen Gesmer, Applying Racial Identity Theory to
the Legal System: The Case of Family Law, in Racial Identity Theory: Applications
to Individual, Group, and Organizational Interventions 219 (C. Thompson & R.
Carter eds., 1997).
102. Ely & Thomas, Cultural Diversity, supra note 66, at 261; see also Carter &
Gesmer, supra note 101, at 219-30.
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approach results both in a more equal distribution of "power and
status" and a more effective strategy for achieving organizational
goals.
The potential implications for the legal profession are profound. If
our organizational goal is equal justice under law, an integration-and-
learning approach will more likely have greater success than the
dominant "bleaching out" paradigm. As Martha Minow has observed,
in a world where differences matter, "a commitment to equality-to
treating like[] [cases alike under the rule of law,]-will be caught in a
contradiction."'' 3 She, like Ely and Thomas, argues that "you cannot
avoid trouble through ignoring difference; you cannot find a solution
in neutrality."" 4 The task for the legal profession is to promote equal
justice in the best way in light of the persistence of group identities.
This effort has yet to be made on any significant scale. Existing
efforts to promote equality, such as judicial commissions on the status
of racial minorities, continue to work within the limited confines of
the "bleaching out" paradigm. The task for the future is for the legal
profession to replace "bleaching out" with the goal of creating an
integration-and-learning community for lawyers, so that we can join to
explore the potential for rule of law in light of how we are all different
from one another, and yet how we are all the same in sharing the goal
of equal justice under law.
CONCLUSION
As intergroup theory teaches us, race provides data essential to
understanding and managing organizational goals. To be a
responsible and constructive member of legal organizations, a white
lawyer must therefore acknowledge that whiteness is a racial identity
and not a background norm. This acknowledgement, in turn, has two
major implications. First, in assessing the legal workplace and legal
system, a white lawyer (like all lawyers) must assess the role race plays
and engage in learning with people of all races to determine how best
to further organizational goals in light of racial differences. Second,
the persistent influence of identity group membership in legal
organizations requires, on both practical and theoretical grounds,
discarding the dominant "bleaching out" approach to professionalism
and rule of law in favor of an integration-and-learning approach to
representing clients and creating a community that recognizes racial
identity as a strength and not a failing.
103. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Intrusion, Exclusion, and
American Law 374 (1990).
104. Id. at 374-75.
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